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ABSTRACT
How do warlords build their legitimacy and eventually exert authority? The case of 
Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Massoud demonstrates that warlords do not only build 
legitimacy through the internal provision of goods and services to the population 
under their control, but also build their legitimacy by projecting authority 
externally, through the development of their own form of diplomacy. In this 
article, I show that warlords develop complex and complementary legitimisation 
strategies that extend beyond their territorial realms to include consequential 
relationships with foreign actors.
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Academics and journalists alike have long singularised warlords for their 
 self-service nature. In this view, warlords are ‘driven overwhelmingly by personal 
power, glory and monetary gain’,1 the raison d’être of warlordism.2 It is widely 
assumed that warlords do not use resources for the purpose of building or 
consolidating a distinct political community, that they do not govern. Warlords 
are not only considered illegitimate on the domestic political scene, they are 
also viewed as irrelevant on the international one.3 Yet, these actors cannot be 
reduced to mere local bandits and criminals. In this article, I retrace the political 
trajectory of Afghan warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud to show, first, that war-
lords can provide crucial services in certain ‘politico-security environments’4 
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(governance) and, second, that they can operate in the international system, 
through the development of their own kind of diplomacy. I argue that warlords 
use their ability to both govern and conduct diplomacy as complementary legit-
imisation strategies that allow them to consolidate their political authority and 
eventually survive in challenging environments.
Warlords can be defined as astute political entrepreneurs with a proven ability 
to organise violence and the faculty to both exert and transform authority across 
different realms (ideological, economic, military, social and political) and at different 
levels of political affairs (local, national and international). They rise in places like 
Afghanistan, Somalia and Syria, when they can be seen as restoring order and 
protecting the population against the violence and mayhem of failed and failing 
states, in which ‘[distrust has become] more salient and consequential’5 and 
people tend to rely primarily on family and kin, ethnic, tribal or otherwise. It is 
in these situations, when the state no longer holds the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence and is not able to provide those crucial services, or when ‘its 
reputation as a defender of its population’6 has been damaged, that warlords 
strive and survive.
Warlords do not only provide security, protection and trust. Their authority 
is not limited to the military sphere, for ‘functional differentiations between 
politics, economics, and the military are virtually non-existent’7 in failed and 
failing states. Warlords provide ‘alternative forms of governance’,8 not necessarily 
conceived as a normative concept associated with ‘good’ and ‘democratic’ gov-
ernance, but rather as the act of governing, the way power is being exercised. 
Governance is ‘a mix of all kinds of governing efforts by all manner of social-po-
litical actors, public as well as private; occurring between them at different lev-
els, in different governance modes and orders’.9 Not only do warlords at times 
provide public services, but they also have a proven track record of providing 
governance, which in turn contributes to the legitimisation of their authority. 
The social capital that these actors use to construct and legitimise their authority 
is based upon their charisma and military strength and operationalised through 
the provision of services and other benefits to people under their control. This 
is governance, but not governance as most states (particularly contemporary 
states) conceive it to be.
Warlords also develop complex survival and legitimisation strategies beyond 
their territorial realms to include consequential (and largely under-researched) 
interactions with the state and international actors. They conduct their own kind 
of warlord diplomacy, a distinctive form of diplomacy that exploits personal 
networks as much as it does formal ties and is conducted to enhance personal 
authority. This suggests that warlord diplomacy is not only a ‘wartime tactic’10 
or a way to acquire political capital within the international system11 but also a 
legitimisation strategy aimed at strengthening one’s personal authority inter-
nally. Schlichte and Schneckener argue that non-state armed actors must rely on 
compatible, even mutually reinforcing sources of legitimacy in order to gain and 
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maintain power.12 In this article, I highlight ‘reinforcing feedback effects between 
domestic and international support’13 and argue that warlord diplomacy and 
‘delivery-based legitimisation’14 are both compatible and complementary.
Methodologically, this article draws on over 200 semi-structured repeat 
interviews with prominent political actors (warlords, governors, ministers, 
diplomats, etc.) I conducted in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2015,15 as part of a 
larger comparative project.16 I asked my interviewees detailed and previously 
prepared open-ended questions about their life histories and then ‘pursued 
topics in depth as seemed appropriate and relevant’.17 While existing work on 
‘rebel diplomacy’ focuses on armed groups and organisations,18 looking at indi-
vidual leaders allows me to conduct careful process tracing of the ways these 
individuals – and Massoud in particular – evolved, transformed their power and 
developed successful survival strategies throughout their political careers, rebels 
one day, quasi-state leaders the next. This method further allows me to shift the 
focus from ‘rebel diplomacy’, ‘a rebel group’s conduct of foreign affairs during 
civil war for the purpose of advancing its military and political objectives’,19 to 
warlord diplomacy.
This work is divided into three sections. In the first section, I show that war-
lords like Massoud have the ability to operate in the international system and 
conduct their own form of diplomacy. The following sections follow a chrono-
logical order and focus on Ahmad Shah Massoud’s political trajectory and legit-
imisation strategies: first as a rebel, from the beginning of the Soviet–Afghan 
war in 1979 up to the fall of the communist regime in 1992, a period during 
which Massoud captured a (well-disposed) community to create a governance 
structure for the regions under his control while simultaneously projecting 
authority externally, through the development of his own foreign policy; then 
as the de facto leader of a quasi-state, from the fall of the communist regime 
up to his assassination on 9 September 2001, a period during which he enjoyed 
official recognition but lost control of most of his territory and during which the 
structure he had created earlier kept operating in parallel to the central state.
Warlords in the international system
Warlords may have ‘intruded upon international relations’, they remain excluded 
from systemic analyses.20 In fact, ‘much of the academic analysis of warlordism 
has been developed at the comparative level and there is a paucity of research 
on warlordism at the level of the international system’.21 Those who conceive 
of warlords as actors of the international system are often limited in the way 
they see international links, as they privilege clandestine networks and do not 
consider how warlords try to influence the interests of international actors 
through diplomacy.22 Diplomacy is widely understood as ‘the strategic use of 
talk by states’23 and by states only, hence depriving non-state armed actors of 
an important source of legitimisation. I argue that warlords have the ability to 
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conduct diplomacy and operate in the international system. They operate as 
alternative providers of governance; challenge the ‘idea of the state’24 and the 
existence of a social contract; and participate in shaping the process of state 
formation. Warlords therefore affect the process of state evolution and impact 
the interstate system.25
If one conceives of states as ‘makers and maintainers of boundaries’ between 
different spheres (public/private, licit/illicit, legal/illegal, etc.) and territories, war-
lords can be considered ‘creatures of the borderlands, growing up in regions 
where states and empires [are] both needy and inexpert’.26 States in turn have 
an interest in using the warlords’ ability to arbitrage, that is, to ‘take advantage 
of a price differential for political, economic, and cultural goods across terrains’ 
as part of their own extraversion strategies.27 While warlords are tied to their 
previous territorial control, their local authority gives them leverage among 
international actors. They take advantage of the complexity and heterogeneity 
of the international system, in which many competing actors with a variety of 
domestic and foreign policy agendas coexist and operate in a system where 
‘subjects are governed by a complex hodgepodge of foreign powers, interna-
tional and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), and domestic institutions’.28
Though warlords ‘interact with a constellation of national and international 
actors who rigidly structure the political environment’,29 they have the ability 
to operate and exert agency in that environment. ‘Today’s successful warlords’, 
writes Mark Duffield, ‘think globally but act locally’.30 They are indeed able to 
‘act financially and politically in the international system without interference 
from the state in which [they are] based’31 while exerting authority at the local 
level. The warlords’ political success (and legitimacy) in part rests on their abil-
ity to conduct their own foreign policy in ways that are otherwise reserved to 
sovereign states (through high-level diplomacy for example), as well as on their 
ability to conduct relations with (and infiltrate) their own state.
The warlords’ faculty to reinvent themselves over time (from rebel to qua-
si-state leader, for example) partly depends on their position in the interna-
tional system. They reject the internal hierarchy on which the existence of the 
Weberian state is based, conduct their own diplomacy (in which the concepts of 
domestic and international undergo a shift) and enter the international system 
de facto, while instrumentalising and subordinating elements of the state. At 
times, they accumulate resources and attempt to replace the state (as rebels). 
At other times, they rule in a mutual understanding with and along the central 
state. Warlords are actors who construct political authority on a different plane 
from the state. They exist on the same territory, but their realms of authority 
do not coincide entirely. In that sense, they may exercise a type of authority 
that is more flexible and durable than that of the state in the broader context 
of instability and violence.
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The rebel leader (1979–1992)
Rebel governance
Ahmad Shah Massoud was born in 1952 in the Panjshir valley town of Jangalak, 
north of Kabul. His father was a Colonel in the Afghan Royal Army of King Zahir 
Shah. His grandfather, Yahya Khan, was a well-respected elder who had also 
worked for the king. The Massoud family held prestige and reputation and 
belonged to the highly respected Sarkarda tribe. Ahmad Shah’s mother came 
from a prominent Panjshiri family of the Bakshi tribe. Like most children of mil-
itary families, Ahmad Shah Massoud had to move regularly and live in different 
parts of the country, until his father was eventually assigned to a position in 
Kabul, where Massoud attended the Lycée Istiqlal and learned to speak French. 
In the early 70s, after he had failed getting in military school, he enrolled at the 
Kabul Polytechnic Institute for Engineering and Architecture, where he became 
increasingly involved with the student wing of Burhanuddin Rabbani’s Jamiat-e 
Islami (Jamiat), a political party inspired from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
that aimed at establishing a state founded on the principles of Sharia law.32
On 17 July 1973, supported by a fraction of the military and by leftist parties 
who had grown dissatisfied with the government’s failure to improve the coun-
try’s overall living standards, infrastructures and public services, Mohammed 
Daoud Khan, King Zahir Shah’s cousin (and long-time political rival), staged a 
(bloodless) coup that ended the Afghan monarchy. The coup, in conjunction 
with the rise of Islamist and communist radicalism, marked the beginning of 
political instability in the country and directly triggered the beginning of Ahmad 
Shah Massoud’s political career. After Daoud took power in 1973, his new gov-
ernment started to imprison radical Islamists. Most of them (including Massoud 
and Rabbani) fled to Pakistan, where the Pakistani authorities, eager to install 
a friendly regime in Kabul, started providing Massoud and others with secret 
military training. In 1975, Massoud joined with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the 
founders of the Jamiat’s student wing, in a revolt against Daoud’s regime. His role 
was to start the uprising in the Panjshir, but he largely failed, due, he believed, 
to a lack of support from the local population. Massoud returned to exile in 
Pakistan; Hekmatyar split from the Jamiat to create his own party, the Hezb-e 
Islami, now considering Massoud, who had remained loyal to the Jamiat’s leader 
Burhanuddin Rabbani, as his most dangerous enemy.33
In April 1978, the pro-Soviet People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 
came to power in a coup against Daoud’s regime, causing uncoordinated upris-
ings all across the country. In December 1979, this was followed by the invasion 
of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, in an attempt to support and ultimately steer 
the new communist regime, in a classic cold war fashion. Massoud, then in his 
mid-20s, returned to the Panjshir to stir up a revolt against the new communist 
government. Others undertook similar action, either on behalf of Rabbani and 
the Jamiat, like Massoud, or under a different political banner. In the meantime, 
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the leaders of all these different political parties remained in Peshawar, Pakistan, 
where they could gather support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and, indirectly, 
the United States (US) – which, in the context of the cold war, started a covert 
action program to support the Afghan holy warriors (mujahideen) in their war 
against the Soviet Union. These political leaders would then redistribute the 
weapons and financial resources they received to their commanders based in 
different parts of Afghanistan, thus fostering the creation of a strong, but highly 
fragmented, resistance movement in the country.34
Massoud showed up in the Panjshir with only a very limited number of men. 
Yet, this time, he did not arrive unannounced. The failure of 1975 had made 
him very well aware of the importance of local legitimacy. Learning from his 
mistakes, Massoud had carefully prepared his return, sending representatives to 
the Panjshir ahead of time to get support from mullahs and elders and hence be 
able to build on his existing social capital (his family’s prestige and reputation), 
which was key to his personal legitimacy and later to his ability to provide gov-
ernance while waging a war (hence relying on mutually reinforcing sources of 
legitimacy). According to one of his former commanders: ‘If [Massoud] had not 
belonged to this family, Panjshiris would not have obeyed him’. Support from 
the tribes was ‘key to his war’.35
Despite his young age, Massoud’s authority in the Panjshir quickly grew, in 
particular due to his charisma and military prowess.36 Opposition in the valley 
was, for the most part, quickly overcome, although sometimes through violent 
means. To further affirm and legitimise his authority, Massoud engaged in con-
siderable propaganda efforts, starting very early on with inscribing anti-Soviet 
slogans on rocks and publishing newspapers that were used by mullahs in their 
Friday prayers. This legitimisation strategy is not uncommon in civil wars. ‘By 
portraying the enemy, be it the state or another armed group, as particularly 
brutal, inhuman and evil’, write Schlichte and Schneckener, ‘the armed group 
aims not only to create solidarity but also to present itself and its violent actions 
as necessary, appropriate and comparatively less destructive’.37
In 1980, a dawat-e Jihad (invitation to holy war), a non-military governing 
body, was created alongside every military base under Massoud’s control. These 
bodies were in charge of recruiting young mujahideen, engaging in propaganda 
efforts, printing newspapers, running radio channels and educating children 
and cadres to the necessity of Jihad against the Soviet Union, hence build-
ing a common symbolic repertoire to ‘bring together the disparate agendas at 
the local level with the central cleavage’.38 Classes for the educated elites were 
organised around disciplines such as international politics and Islamic ideology. 
Massoud, a fervent reader of Mao, Che Guevara and others, even taught a class 
on guerrilla warfare.39
Although the valley was only inhabited by about eighty thousand people, it 
was of vital importance to the Soviet Union, for it neighboured their main and 
only reliable overland supply route to Kabul, the Salang highway (and tunnel) 
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passing through the Hindu Kush mountains. Once Massoud had established 
his authority in the valley, he and his men started raiding and looting Soviet 
convoys on the Salang highway, using hit-and-run tactics before quickly dis-
appearing in the adjacent mountains. The Soviet Union reacted to Massoud’s 
attacks by launching six consecutive assaults on the Panjshir valley between 
1980 and 1982, but could never defeat Massoud, although he only commanded 
over roughly one thousand fighters at the time of the first assault. Thanks to 
Massoud’s intelligence networks in the Afghan Army, his forces were able to 
disappear and hide in the mountains before aerial bombings began, to later 
suddenly reappear and surprise Soviet tanks entering the Panjshir. By targeting 
the first and last tanks going through the narrow valley, Massoud’s forces were 
able to stop entire columns, forcing the Soviets to abandon their tanks to the 
enemy.40
Over the years, Massoud also became increasingly autonomous from Rabbani 
and the rest of the Jamiat leadership based in Peshawar. In 1983, a blockade 
organised by the Hezb-e Islami caused a critical food shortage in the Panjshir. 
Massoud reacted by concluding a temporary truce with the Soviet Union, first 
reaching out to Afghan Government officials and military personnel, then dis-
cussing directly with Soviet KGB officers without consulting with the Jamiat 
leadership. The agreement, formally endorsed by the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party in Moscow, stipulated that all Soviet troops had to leave the 
Panjshir (except for one battalion located at the southern entrance of the valley). 
Until then, Massoud had not been able to exert his own high-level diplomacy. 
Although the truce certainly worsened his relationships with the party and the 
Pakistani authorities, he felt it ‘would raise his stature by placing him on an equal 
footing with a superpower’.41 It established Massoud, the ‘Lion of the Panjshir’, 
as a major player able to conduct his own diplomacy with the Soviet Union and 
hence affirm his independence vis-à-vis the Jamiat leadership.
The truce further allowed Massoud to assert his autonomy from Rabbani 
and the party by extending his sphere of influence (not without encountering 
local resistance). Liberated from Soviet pressure, Massoud moved north and cre-
ated a proto-state structure named the Shurah-e Nazar (Supervisory Council) to 
govern most of north-eastern Afghanistan. The move had mutually reinforcing 
objectives: defeat rival organisations (in particular the Hezb-e Islami) and hence 
further secure the Panjshir; bring law and order to an extended fiefdom; and 
further establish his autonomy vis-à-vis the Jamiat. Massoud formed a civilian 
shadow government separated from the military one, at a time when the activ-
ities of most Afghan commanders were limited to classic guerrilla tactics with 
no governing capacities. Various committees were created within the Shurah-e 
Nazar to provide a number of services to the population: a taxation system, 
courts, military police, education, a bank, etc.42 Although these committees 
were not always fully functional, they provided the commencements of what 
could be dubbed rebel governance, that is, ‘the production of government for 
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civilians during the protracted violence and high levels of coercion produced 
by civil war’.43
Rebel diplomacy
In the same period, Massoud also developed his own warlord diplomacy, then 
a form of rebel diplomacy aimed at building his personal authority, at first inter-
acting mostly with foreign journalists (a critical component of the international 
arena,44 especially for rebels with limited outside access). As Bridget Coggins 
perceptively notes: ‘Using media outlets and personal contacts to spread the 
insurgents’ ideology, propagandise, and inform may win the favour or neutrality 
of key constituencies’.45 Western journalists started to provide detailed reports 
of Massoud’s war in the Panjshir as early as 1981. Foreigners established close 
relationships with Massoud, spreading his message of resistance to the Soviets 
throughout Europe, contributing to his fame and attracting more media atten-
tion, as part of his own ‘marketing’ strategy (hence increasing his personal legit-
imacy and eventually ‘inventing an icon’).46 Journalists from around the world 
started to come to the Panjshir. If a British journalist wanted to come to the 
Panjshir, for example, he first had to contact Massoud’s brother, Ahmad Wali, 
the Shurah-e Nazar representative in the United Kingdom (UK); Ahmad Wali 
would then contact someone in the Peshawar office that was created in parallel 
to the one of the Jamiat; and then that person would have to coordinate with 
someone in the Panjshir. Not only did Massoud have people in Peshawar in 
charge of organising their trip to the Panjshir, but he also had a person of trust 
to take care of them once in the valley. He even had a guesthouse built to make 
sure they would be properly hosted.47
According to the former Shurah-e Nazar representative in Washington, 
‘Massoud didn’t leave Afghanistan [from 1979 to 1990]. He reached people out-
side through intelligence, diplomatic channels, but mostly through journalists’.48 
For Massoud’s former head of intelligence, it was ‘a strategy to avoid [the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani secret service] and get international con-
nections’ free of interference from the party (which also contributed to building 
his domestic legitimacy vis-à-vis the population under his control).49 All in all, 
Massoud was very well aware of the importance of good public relations (PR). 
He knew the role the media could play in shaping his image and portraying 
him as the main resistant leader to the Soviets in the West and how this could 
benefit him in the long run, both internally and externally.
Massoud’s relations with NGO workers followed a similar pattern. They often 
took the same routes as journalists and were in contact with the same people. 
NGOs played an important role in the functioning of Massoud’s complex admin-
istration. The Shurah-e Nazar in fact depended on them for most non-military 
matters: health, reconstruction, education, etc.50 Massoud was able to harness 
NGOs and international organisations working in his fiefdom as part of a strategy 
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of asserting power through providing protection and taking credit for services 
that foreigners provided, an indirect ‘delivery-based legitimisation’ of sorts. 
Hence, the importance, for Massoud, of boosting his image abroad, claiming 
a monopoly over diplomatic channels and portraying himself not only as the 
main leader of the anti-Soviet resistance but also as a ‘good’ warlord, that is, a 
military figure that NGOs would be willing to support.
In parallel, Massoud developed international networks through his offices 
abroad, such as the ones in London and Peshawar previously mentioned. 
Massoud’s ability to connect with foreign countries was still limited, as officially 
he remained a commander working under the Jamiat leadership. The party 
started to open offices around the world in the mid-1980s, with people lobbying 
in Washington, DC, New York, London or Paris to get financial and military sup-
port, with both Rabbani and Massoud sending their own people to make sure 
their personal interests would be represented. In addition to bringing journalists 
to the Panjshir, the Peshawar office was also in charge of setting up direct links to 
foreign services. It is, for example, thanks to this office that Massoud established 
a connection with Abdullah Azzam (one of the future founders of al-Qaeda) and 
in turn started receiving aid from the Arab world through Azzam’s networks of 
supporters. Other offices had similar though less covert activities (meeting with 
journalists, state officials and Members of Parliament; publishing newspapers; 
etc.). The offices were also taking care of getting support from the Afghan Tajik 
diaspora, which was providing extra lobbying power as well as finding buyers 
for the gems of the Panjshir valley. These offices became increasingly important 
and Massoud soon started to staff them with people of trust: the Peshawar office 
was reinforced with some of his most trusted advisors in the midst of the war 
as the Soviets started attacking the Panjshir again; and Massoud sent his own 
brother to be his representative in London.51
However, in the absence of direct contacts with the ISI, Massoud remained 
highly dependent on the Jamiat’s redistribution of resources for weapons and 
ammunition provided by the Pakistani intelligence. For a long time, the only 
external support he received was military training (both inside and outside 
Afghanistan) and material (radios, communication material, etc.) from France 
and the UK. The French, who also provided doctors, nurses and money for 
reconstruction, liked to portray Massoud as an Afghan liberator, probably in 
part because he went to Afghanistan’s only French high school (and was there-
fore able to speak French). In fact, his bourgeois upbringing, urban youth and 
Western-style education certainly explain the relative ease with which Massoud 
interacted with Western countries in general and France in particular.52
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been suspicious of Massoud since 
he had signed a truce with the Soviet Union. In 1984 they started to provide 
him with cash through the Peshawar office up to, according to an American 
journalist, $200,000 a month in 1989, with two additional payments of $900,000 
and $500,000 made to one of his brothers between May 1989 and January 
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1990. Massoud eventually sent his representatives to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to 
meet with Prince Turki al-Faisal, the chief of Saudi intelligence and facilitate 
a rapprochement with the ISI. He himself took a trip to Peshawar in 1990 to 
meet with the ISI Director and the CIA Station Chief, a trip that led to increased 
shipments from the Pakistani intelligence service.53
The quasi-state leader (1992–2001)
From rebel to quasi-state leader
On 14 April 1988, on the brink of collapse, the Soviet Union signed the Geneva 
agreement, by which it promised to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan 
between May 1988 and February 1989. Contrary to American expectations, 
the communist regime was able to remain firmly in place for another three 
years. Through his connections in the government and the army, Massoud was 
allegedly offered the defence minister position in the communist regime, as 
well as the leadership of an autonomous north-eastern region to be created. 
He turned both offers down. Unlike other warlords who pursued regionalist 
interests, Massoud always had a national project and a national ambition, aimed 
at capturing and centralising power, something that has always remained con-
sistent in his external communication. For him more than for anyone else, the 
state had become the principal objective, providing international recognition, 
legitimacy and resources.54
After Moscow’s supplies to the Afghan communist regime got cut off with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Massoud started approaching 
the most powerful pro-government commanders of the North to plan the cap-
ture of Kabul and the ensuing power-sharing arrangements. Massoud was des-
ignated to become the future defence minister through the Peshawar accord, a 
power-sharing agreement signed by the main political leaders exiled in Pakistan 
on 24 April 1992, the day before he and his northern allies took control of the 
capital. Starting in 1992, Massoud and Rabbani (who would become President 
of the Islamic State of Afghanistan a few months later) therefore controlled 
the most important buildings in Kabul. As such they were recognised by the 
international community as the official government of Afghanistan, although 
they could not meet the demands of empirical statehood, hence becoming 
the representatives of a quasi-state, a state that is recognised as such by the 
international community but does not have the capacities to exert de facto 
sovereignty.55 Not only was the new government unable to control and exert 
effective power over the entire territory – after all no Afghan ruler has ever met 
this standard – but it could not even control the whole capital city, which was 
divided between armed factions and became the scene of violent combats. 
The end of the communist regime had resulted in a violent power struggle and 
changing alliances between the different armed groups, some that had partic-
ipated in the highly fragmented anti-Soviet resistance (the Jamiat, the Hezb-e 
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Islami, etc.), others led by former militia commanders who had been fighting 
alongside the communist regime.56
Yet, despite the government’s weakness, by seizing Kabul and capturing 
state institutions (which was facilitated by the Panjshir’s geographical prox-
imity to the capital), Massoud had become the state (a quasi-state), a major 
shift from the previous period. Although Rabbani was officially the President 
of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, de facto Massoud was exerting authority on 
behalf of the state, hence benefiting from international recognition. As an acute 
observer of Afghan politics once told me, the Rabbani–Massoud relationship 
was in some ways comparable to the one between King of France Louis the XIII 
and Cardinal Richelieu in the seventeenth century: Rabbani was the legitimate 
monarch (with the advantage of printing money and receiving hard currency) to 
whom Massoud was paying allegiance, but the latter, because of his charisma, 
military skills and local legitimacy, was in command.57 At the time Massoud 
took Kabul, Rabbani had pressured him to end the Shurah-e Nazar, which had 
already become largely independent of the Jamiat during the Soviet–Afghan 
war. While Massoud accepted and announced the dissolution of the proto-state 
structure, he never took concrete actions to end it, maintaining his own separate 
structure as a way to build his personal authority, in parallel to both the state 
and the party. According to American reporter Steve Coll:
By 1994 the Panjshiris were seen by many Pashtuns in Kabul as a kind of bat-
tle-fighting mafia. United by a decade of continuous war under Massoud’s 
charismatic leadership, the Panjshiris were close-knit, tough, secretive, and a 
government within the government.58
Rabbani’s government’s exercise of power was further undermined with the 
creation, in 1994, of the Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist militant movement 
that aimed at conquering power, progressively took control of most of the 
country (except the north-eastern corner) and eventually seized Kabul in 1996. 
While Massoud and Rabbani had gained international recognition by captur-
ing the capital and toppling the government in 1992, the same rule did not 
apply to the Taliban. Only three countries recognised the Taliban as the official 
regime in Afghanistan: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.59 
Rabbani’s government remained the official representative of the Islamic State of 
Afghanistan throughout the war, even though it no longer controlled Kabul and 
had to move to the north-east of the country, still controlled by Massoud and 
his men, in 1996. Massoud reacted to this forced exile by creating and leading 
the Northern Alliance, a loose coalition of warlords and commanders who had 
fought against each other throughout the 1990s.60
From then onwards, Tajikistan remained the Afghan government’s only 
land contact to the outside and thus became of tremendous strategic value. 
Engaged in his own war against Islamist radicals and afraid that they would join 
the Taliban, President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmanov (nowadays known as 
Emomali Rahmon) started supporting Massoud. The government of Afghanistan 
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was given access to Tajik airports as well as the permission to enter Tajik territory 
without visas, which provided Massoud with both a safe haven (where he could 
hold his diplomatic meetings safely) and a direct access road for Russia and Iran 
to deliver military supplies (see below).61
Quasi-state diplomacy
Since the beginning of the Soviet–Afghan war, Massoud had always recognised 
the value of good PR and foreign policy. Belonging to the officially recognised 
Government of Afghanistan gave him the means to develop a fully fledged 
diplomatic campaign and become a real ‘wartime diplomat’.62 His first step 
was to build a diplomatic corps, both by sending representatives abroad and 
by delegating diplomatic tasks to senior aides to get broader international 
support and rally the Afghan diaspora to the anti-Taliban resistance, under his 
leadership. Massoud continued to search for potential backers and dispatch 
some of his most trusted aides abroad, this time as official representatives of 
the Afghan Government. His representatives were asked to meet very specific 
people from whom Massoud could get support.63 Ahmed Wali, for example, 
remembers meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto or the Aga 
Khan on his brother’s request.64
Massoud had a profound understanding of international affairs, knew how to 
read his audience and adapted his discourse accordingly. With the emergence 
of the Taliban, and even more so after they took control of Kabul in 1996, he 
portrayed himself as the last rampart against Islamic radicalism and a defender 
of women’s emancipation, always depicting the Taliban as a threat to the Islamic 
world and the West.65 The role of his most trusted lieutenants overseas therefore 
shifted with the geopolitical context, from explaining to foreigners the danger 
the Soviets represented to that of a radical group (the Taliban) associated with 
a terrorist organisation (al-Qaeda), while continuing their efforts to reach out to 
the Afghan diaspora. Dr Abdullah, Massoud’s former spokesman-turned minister 
of foreign affairs, recalls that after the Taliban took control of Kabul, the main 
offices abroad, in particular the UK and the US ones (staffed mostly by Massoud’s 
and Rabbani’s aides and ethnic Tajiks in exile), also started to work as branch 
offices of the ministry of foreign affairs.66
Massoud was also sending his representatives to foreign countries. Dr 
Abdullah, attended conferences and multilateral events (Economic Organization 
Conference, United Nations Millennium Summit, etc.), spread Massoud’s mes-
sage abroad (Iran, India, Uzbekistan, etc.), and dealt with the diplomatic mis-
sions. Massoud also started travelling abroad for important occasions. His efforts 
to create a competent diplomatic team were accompanied with his personal 
involvement in his foreign policy through extensive foreign travel, in contrast 
to his approach during the Soviet–Afghan war or while in Kabul. Although 
Massoud had previously built his aura around the fact that he had always 
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stayed in Afghanistan, he started to act as a state leader and take numerous 
trips abroad, including to Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, India and France.
Like the other countries in the region, the Russian Government became con-
cerned after the Taliban took Kabul and advanced north towards Mazar-e Sharif. 
Massoud, who had developed his Russian networks during the Soviet–Afghan 
war and through his later involvement in the Tajik peace process, travelled to 
Moscow in 1997 to open negotiations about arms supplies and airfield access. 
He later met with the Russian defence minister in Dushanbe, took another trip 
to Moscow to meet with President Putin in 2000 and eventually started buying 
weapons and ammunitions from the former occupying power he had spent a 
decade fighting against.67
Massoud’s relations with Teheran, cold at best, also changed dramatically 
as the Taliban took Mazar-e Sharif, attacked the Iranian consulate and killed 
everyone inside (including several dozens of diplomats and Sepah-e Pasdaran, 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) in 1998. Massoud requested an urgent meeting 
with the Iranian authorities as they had gathered soldiers to the border with 
Afghanistan for retaliation against the Taliban. An Iranian Falcon was sent to 
Dushanbe to pick him up and brought him to Teheran to meet with the foreign 
affairs minister and his deputy. Massoud, now the uncontested leader of the 
Afghan resistance, persuaded the Iranians to go through him and to give him 
the monopoly over arms and ammunition distribution instead of attacking the 
Taliban directly. From there on, Massoud received regular deliveries of ammu-
nition and logistical aid from Iran through Dushanbe, with the support of the 
Tajik Government.
A number of other countries offered minimal support. Massoud was in con-
tact with the Uzbek authorities and travelled a couple of times to Tashkent, 
where he met with President Karimov and the head of the Uzbek secret service. 
Massoud also took a diplomatic trip to New Delhi in 2000, but India only offered 
limited political support and built a military hospital in the north-eastern city 
of Farghar, in the zone under his control.68 France had been providing limited 
support, most notably paying for the Jamiat mission and the Afghan embassy 
in Paris and delivering computers and radio equipment, but nothing significant 
since the end of the Soviet–Afghan war.
In April 2001, Massoud travelled to Strasbourg, France, to speak in front of 
the European Parliament. A few months earlier, an invitation had been made 
to French politicians to visit Massoud in the Panjshir, as part of a PR operation. 
The invitation was then extended to a group of European Parliament members 
and a resolution condemning the Taliban regime adopted by the European 
Parliament shortly thereafter. Massoud was then invited to Strasbourg, where 
he met with a number of European officials, political groups and parliament 
members, to give a speech before the European Parliament. This speech, which 
was particularly well received, greatly boosted his international image and his 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the Afghan diaspora.69
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Yet, Massoud was fully aware that PR operations and a safe heaven, though 
necessary to the survival of the government in exile, would not be sufficient to 
defeat the Taliban. He quickly understood the need for US support. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, Massoud’s relationship with the CIA had been bumpy. The US agency 
had been very suspicious of him since he had refused their demand to close the 
Salang highway during the Soviet–Afghan war (for he also needed this major 
trade route to remain open) and sceptical of his potential role in the fight against 
al-Qaeda. Furthermore, with the end of the cold war, the American interest for 
Afghanistan faded and the CIA stopped supporting Massoud.70 Contacts were 
re-established in September 1996, right before the Taliban capture of Kabul, 
as the CIA’s Islamabad Station Chief Gary Schroen flew into the Afghan capital 
to discuss a Stinger missile recovery programme with Massoud.71 The meeting 
‘marked the rebirth of unilateral CIA engagement with Afghanistan after a four-
year hiatus’.72 The contacts were maintained in the following years, as the CIA 
sent teams to the Panjshir to help Massoud and his men with logistical issues, 
as well as establish direct secure communication lines between him and the CIA 
headquarters to pass along information on Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.
State Department officials retained a negative bias towards the Panjshiri 
leader, whom they considered to be self-righteous. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright and the rest of the Clinton administration remained deeply sceptical of 
Massoud and his allies in the Northern Alliance. The US Ambassador to Pakistan 
believed that supplying arms to Massoud would only fuel the conflict along 
ethnic lines. Others were concerned about alleged drug-related activities under-
taken by the Shurah-e Nazar. The situation changed with al-Qaeda’s bombings 
of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. A more nuanced policy towards 
Massoud emerged out of the State Department in the summer of 1999. Clinton 
declared a policy of strict neutrality in the Afghan Civil War, but stated that his 
administration would be willing to cooperate with Massoud on intelligence 
operations. At the same time, the US made it clear to Iran and Russia that they 
did not oppose their arms deliveries to Massoud. Massoud later tried to convince 
the new Bush administration to do more for the Afghan resistance. He wrote 
a letter to Vice President Cheney, dispatched Dr Abdullah to Washington and 
even hired a lobbyist there, but to no avail. State Department policy towards 
the Northern Alliance would only change after Massoud’s death and the attacks 
on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon that followed two days later.73
Conclusion
Massoud’s successful political career can be attributed to a variety of factors. 
Above all, the ‘Lion of the Panjshir’ was a charismatic leader with ‘a strong sense 
of survival [and] a special nose for guerrilla warfare and tactics’.74 As a rebel, 
he used these to take advantage of the geography of the Panjshir and resist 
the Soviets, extending his local authority, protecting the population, providing 
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governance and contributing to the creation of his own ‘brand’75 internationally, 
in particular through the media. Foreign journalists ‘fell in love with him’, said 
his former representative in Washington, DC, so much so that The Wall Street 
Journal called him ‘the Afghan who won the Cold War’.76
In the long term, Massoud did not owe his political survival to his sole military 
achievements and branding. He also had unmatched diplomatic and inter-per-
sonal skills, which allowed him to negotiate with and turn former enemies into 
allies (both internally and externally), seize the central state, obtain international 
recognition and represent his military prowess and charismatic leadership capa-
bilities to a variety of foreign governments. These governments were acting 
on their national interests and may have preferred cooperation with Massoud 
because he controlled strategic territory. Nonetheless, they became more eager 
to work with him as a consequence of his self-representation. Massoud was 
able to use the resources that these foreigners provided to him to assert his 
domestic authority. In fact, the international diplomacy of the warlord gave him 
the autonomy to rule as he saw fit. While further research on the relationship 
between non-state armed groups’ internal and external sources of legitimacy 
(and legitimisation strategies) is required, the case of Ahmad Shah Massoud 
shows that, in certain circumstances, the ability to project authority internally 
(through governance) and the ability to conduct foreign relations are mutually 
reinforcing. The ability to behave like a state internally and that to do so exter-
nally are intrinsically linked.77
On 9 September 2001, two days before the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon, two al-Qaeda agents disguised as journalists 
played Massoud’s desire to promote his reputation in the Arab world to obtain 
an interview. During the audience they blew themselves up and killed the 
Panjshiri leader,78 unintentionally participating in the creation of the Massoud 
‘myth’ in Afghan politics.79 One of Massoud’s main strengths, his ability to com-
municate and reach out to the media, had become a source of vulnerability 
that his enemies were able to exploit in order to destabilise the anti-Taliban 
resistance, in anticipation of the forthcoming US-led intervention (thus fore-
shadowing the events of 9/11).
In the end, Massoud’s assassins did not manage to completely disorganise 
the resistance, at least not sufficiently to prevent the Northern Alliance, assisted 
by overwhelming US firepower, from taking over Kabul. What it did achieve, 
however, was deprive the Northern Alliance, and Afghanistan in general, from a 
highly charismatic political leader. Given Massoud’s inability to unite the differ-
ent factions under his leadership in the aftermath of the Soviet–Afghan war, it 
is unlikely, however, that he would have been able to unite the different groups 
under his name in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.
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